The Frye Arrests
On August 11, 1965, California Highway Patrolman Lee W. Minikus, a Caucasian, was riding his motorcycle along 122nd street,
just south of the Los Angeles City boundary, when a passing Negro motorist told him he had just seen a car that was being
driven recklessly. Minikus gave chase and pulled the car over at 116th and Avalon, in a predominantly Negro neighborhood,
near but not in Watts. It was 7: 00 p.m.
The driver was Marquette Frye, a 21-year-old Negro, and his older brother, Ronald, 22, was a passenger. Minikus asked Marquette
to get out and take the standard Highway Patrol sobriety test. Frye failed the test, and at 7:05 p.m., Minikus told him he
was under arrest. He radioed for his motorcycle partner, for a car to take Marquette to jail, and a tow truck to take the
car away.
They were two blocks from the Frye home, in an area of two-story apartment buildings and numerous small family residences.
Because it was a very warm evening, many of the residents were outside.
Ronald Frye, having been told he could not take the car when Marquette was taken to jail, went to get their mother so that
she could claim the car. They returned to the scene about 7:15 p.m. as the second motorcycle patrolman, the patrol car, and
tow truck arrived. The original group of 25 to 50 curious spectators had grown to 250 to 300 persons.
Mrs. Frye approached Marquette and scolded him for drinking. Marquette, who until then had been peaceful and cooperative,
pushed her away and moved toward the crowd, cursing and shouting at the officers that they would have to kill him to take
him to jail. The patrolmen pursued Marquette and he resisted.
The watching crowd became hostile, and one of the patrolmen radioed for more help. Within minutes, three more highway patrolmen
arrived. Minikus and his partner were now struggling with both Frye brothers. Mrs. Frye, now belligerent, jumped on the back
of one of the officers and ripped his shirt. In an attempt to subdue Marquette, one officer swung at his shoulder with a night
stick, missed, and struck him on the forehead, inflicting a minor cut. By 7:23 p.m., all three of the Fryes were under arrest,
and other California Highway Patrolmen and, for the first time, Los Angeles police officers had arrived in response to the
call for help.
Officers on the scene said there were now more than 1,000 persons in the crowd. About 7:25 p.m., the patrol car with the
prisoners, and the tow truck pulling the Frye car, left the scene. At 7:31 p.m., the Fryes arrived at a nearby sheriff's substation.
Undoubtedly the situation at the scene of the arrest was tense. Belligerence and resistance to arrest called for forceful
action by the officers. This brought on hostility from Mrs. Frye and some of the bystanders, which, in turn, caused increased
actions by the police. Anger at the scene escalated and, as in all such situations, bitter recriminations from both sides
followed.
Considering the undisputed facts, the Commission finds that the arrest of the Fryes was handled efficiently and expeditiously.
The sobriety test administered by the California Highway Patrol and its use of a transportation vehicle for the prisoner and
a tow truck to remove his car are in accordance with the practices of other law enforcement agencies, including the Los Angeles
Police Department.
The Spitting Incident
As the officers were leaving the scene, someone in the crowd spat on one of them. They stopped withdrawing and two highway
patrolmen went into the crowd and arrested a young Negro woman and a man who was said to have been inciting the crowd to violence
when the officers were arresting her. Although the wisdom of stopping the withdrawal to make these arrests has been questioned,
the Commission finds no basis for criticizing the judgment of the officers on the scene.
Following these arrests, all officers withdrew at 7:40 p.m. As the last police car left the scene, it was stoned by the
now irate mob.
As has happened so frequently in riots in other cities, inflated and distorted rumors concerning the arrests spread quickly
to adjacent areas. The young woman arrested for spitting was wearing a barber's smock, and the false rumor spread throughout
the area that she was pregnant and had been abused by police. Erroneous reports were also circulated concerning the treatment
of the Fryes at the arrest scene.
The crowd did not disperse, but ranged in small groups up and down the street, although never more than a few blocks from
the arrest scene. Between 8:15 p.m. and midnight, the mob stoned automobiles, pulled Caucasian motorists out of their cars
and beat them, and menaced a police field command post which had been set up in the area. By 1:00 a.m., the outbreak seemed
to be under control but, until early morning hours, there were sporadic reports of unruly mobs, vandalism, and rock throwing.
Twenty-nine persons were arrested.
A Meeting Misfires
On Thursday morning, there was an uneasy calm, but it was obvious that tensions were still high. A strong expectancy of
further trouble kept the atmosphere tense in the judgment of both police and Negro leaders. The actions by many individuals,
both Negro and white, during Thursday, as well as at other times, to attempt to control the riots are commendable. We have
heard many vivid and impressive accounts of the work of Negro leaders, social workers, probation officers, churchmen, teachers,
and businessmen in their attempts to persuade the people to desist from their illegal activities, to stay in their houses
and off the street, and to restore order.
However, the meeting called by the Los Angeles County Human Relations Commission, at the request of county officials, for
the purpose of lowering the temperature misfired. That meeting was held beginning about 2:00 p.m. in an auditorium at Athens
Park, eleven blocks from the scene of the arrest. It brought together every available representative of neighborhood groups
and Negro leaders to discuss the problem. Members of the press, television, and radio covered the meeting. Various elected
officials participated and members of the Los Angeles Police Department, Sheriff's Office and District Attorney's Office were
in attendance as observers.
Several community leaders asked members of the audience to use their influence to persuade area residents to stay home
Thursday evening. Even Mrs. Frye spoke and asked the crowd to "help me and others calm this situation down so that we will
not have a riot tonight." But one Negro high school youth ran to the microphones and said the rioters would attack adjacent
white areas that evening. This inflammatory remark was widely reported on television and radio, and it was seldom balanced
by reporting of the many responsible statements made at the meeting. Moreover, it appears that the tone and conduct of the
meeting shifted, as the meeting was in progress, from attempted persuasion with regard to the maintenance of law and order
to a discussion of the grievances felt by the Negro.
Following the main meeting, certain leaders adjourned to a small meeting where they had discussions with individuals representing
youth gangs and decided upon a course of action. They decided to propose that Caucasian officers be withdrawn from the troubled
area, and that Negro officers in civilian clothes and unmarked cars be substituted. Members of this small group then went
to see Deputy Chief of Police Roger Murdock at the 77th Street Station, where the proposals were rejected by him at about
7:00 p.m. They envisaged an untested method of handling a serious situation that was rapidly developing. Furthermore, the
proposal to use only Negro officers ran counter to the policy of the Police Department, adopted over a period of time at the
urging of Negro leaders, to deploy Negro officers throughout the city and not concentrate them in the Negro area. Indeed,
when the proposal came the police had no immediate means of determining where the Negro officers on the forces were stationed.
At this moment, rioting was breaking out again, and the police felt that their established procedures were the only way to
handle what was developing as another night of rioting. Following those procedures, the police decided to set up a perimeter
around the center of trouble and keep all crowd activity within that area.
An Alert Is Sounded
About 5:00 p.m. Thursday, after receiving a report on the Athens Park meeting, Police Chief William H. Parker called Lt.
Gen. Roderic Hill, the Adjutant General of the California National Guard in Sacramento, and told hirn that the Guard might
be needed. This step was taken pursuant to a procedure instituted by Governor Brown and agreed upon in 1963 and 1964 between
the Los Angeles Police Department, the Governor and the Guard. It was an alert that the Guard might be needed.
Pursuant to the agreed-upon procedure, General Hill sent Colonel Robert Quick to Los Angeles to work as liaison officer.
He also alerted the commanders of the 40th Armored Division located in Southern California to the possibility of being called.
In addition, in the absence of Governor Brown who was in Greece, he called the acting Governor, Lieutenant Governor Glenn
Anderson, in Santa Barbara, and informed him of the Los Angeles situation.
The Emergency Control Center at Police Headquarters - a specially outfitted command post - was opened at 7:30 p.m. on Thursday.
That day, one hundred and ninety deputy sheriffs were asked for and assigned. Between 6:45 and 7:15 p.m., crowds at the scene
of the trouble of the night before had grown to more than 1,000. Firemen who came into the area to fight fires in three overturned
automobiles were shot at and bombarded with rocks. The first fire in a commercial establishment was set only one block from
the location of the Frye arrests, and police had to hold back rioters as firemen fought the blaze.
Shortly before midnight, rock-throwing and looting crowds for the first time ranged outside the perimeter. Five hundred
police officers, deputy sheriffs and highway patrolmen used various techniques, including fender-to-fender sweeps by police
cars, in seeking to disperse the mob. By 4:00 a.m. Friday, the police department felt that the situation was at least for
the moment under control. At 5:09 a.m., officers were withdrawn from emergency perimeter control.
During the evening on Thursday, Lt. Gov. Anderson had come to his home in suburban Los Angeles from Santa Barbara. While
at his residence, he was informed that there were as many as 8,000 rioters in the streets. About 1:00 a.m. Friday, he talked
by phone to John Billett of his staff and with General Hill, and both advised him that police officials felt the situation
was nearing control. About 6:45 a.m., at Lt. Gov. Anderson's request, Billet called the Emergency Control Center and was told
by Sergeant Jack Eberhardt, the intelligence officer on duty, that "the situation was rather well in hand," and this information
was promptly passed on to Anderson. Anderson instructed Billett to keep in touch with him and left Los Angeles at 7:25 a.m.
for a morning meeting of the Finance Committee of the Board of Regents of the University of California in Berkeley, and
an afternoon meeting of the full Board.
Friday, the 13th
Around 8:00 a.m., crowds formed again in the vicinity of the Frye arrests and in the adjacent Watts business area, and
looting resumed. Before 9:00 a.m., Colonel Quick called General Hill in Sacramento from the Emergency Control Center and told
him riot activity was intensifying.
At approximately 9:15 a.m., Mayor Sam Yorty and Chief Parker talked on the telephone, and they decided, at that time, to
call the Guard. Following this conversation, Mayor Yorty went to the airport and boarded a 10:05 flight to keep a speaking
engagement at the Commonwealth Club in San Francisco. Mayor Yorty told our Commission that "by about IO: 00 or so, I have
to decide whether I am going to disappoint that audience in San Francisco and maybe make my city look rather ridiculous if
the rioting doesn't start again, and the mayor has disappointed that crowd." The Mayor returned to the City at 3:35 p.m.
The riot situation was canvassed in a Los Angeles Police Department staff meeting held at 9:45 a.m. where Colonel Quick,
of the California National Guard, was in attendance, along with police officials. At 10:00 a.m., according to Colonel Quick,
Chief Parker said, "It looks like we are going to have to call the troops. We will need a thousand men." Colonel Quick has
said that Chief Parker did not specifically ask him to get the National Guard. On the other hand, Chief Parker has stated
that he told Colonel Quick that he wanted the National Guard and that Quick indicated that he would handle the request.
In any event, at 10:15 a.m., Colonel Quick informed General Hill by telephone that Chief Parker would probably request
1,000 national guardsmen. General Hill advised Colonel Quick to have Chief Parker call the Governor's office in Sacramento.
At 10:50 a.m., Parker made the formal request for the National Guard to Winslow Christian, Governor Brown's executive secretary,
who was then in Sacramento, and Christian accepted the request.
By mid-morning, a crowd of 3,000 had gathered in the commercial section of Watts and there was general looting in that
district as well as in adjacent business areas. By the time the formal request for the Guard had been made, ambulance drivers
and firemen were refusing to go into the riot area without an armed escort.
Calling the Guard
At approximately 11:00 a.m., Christian reached Lt. Gov. Anderson by telephone in Berkeley and relayed Chief Parker's request.
Lt. Gov. Anderson did not act on the request at that time. We believe that this request from ' the chief law enforcement officer
of the stricken city for the National Guard should have been honored without delay. If the Lieutenant Governor was in doubt
about conditions in Los Angeles, he should, in our view, have confirmed Chief Parker's estimate by telephoning National Guard
officers in Los Angeles. Although we are mindful that it was natural and prudent for the Lieutenant Governor to be cautious
in acting in the absence of Governor Brown, we feel that, in this instance, he hesitated when he should have acted.
Feeling that he wished to consider the matter further, Lt. Gov. Anderson returned to Los Angeles by way of Sacramento.
A propeller-driven National Guard plane picked him up at Oakland at 12:20 p.m., and reached McClellan Air Force Base, near
Sacramento, at 1:00 p.m. Anderson met with National Guard officers and civilian staff members and received various suggestions,
ranging from advice from Guard officers that he commit the Guard immediately to counsel from some civilian staff members that
he examine the situation in Los Angeles and meet with Chief Parker before acting. Although Anderson still did not reach a
decision to commit the Guard, he agreed with Guard officers that the troops should be assembled in the Armories at 5 p.m.,
which he had been told by General Hill was the earliest hour that it was feasible to do so. Hill then ordered 2,000 men to
be at the armories by that hour. Anderson's plane left Sacramento for Los Angeles at 1:35 p.m. and arrived at 3:35 p.m.
At the time Lt. Gov. Anderson and General Hill were talking in Sacramento, approximately 856 Guardsmen in the 3rd Brigade
were in the Long Beach area 12 miles to the south, while enroute from San Diego, outfitted with weapons, to summer camp at
Camp Roberts. We feel it reasonable to conclude, especially since this unit was subsequently used in the curfew area, that
further escalation of the riots might have been averted if these Guardsmen had been diverted promptly and deployed on station
throughout the riot area by early or mid-afternoon Friday.
Friday afternoon, Hale Champion, State Director of Finance, who was in the Governor's office in Los Angeles, reached Governor
Brown in Athens. He briefed the Governor on the current riot situation, and Brown said he felt the Guard should be called
immediately, that the possibility of a curfew should be explored, and that he was heading home as fast as possible.
Early Friday afternoon, rioters jammed the streets, began systematically to burn two blocks of 103rd Street in Watts, and
drove off firemen by sniper fire and by throwing missiles. By late afternoon, gang activity began to spread the disturbance
as far as fifty and sixty blocks to the north.
Lieutenant Governor Anderson arrived at the Van Nuys Air National Guard Base at 3:35 p.m. After talking with Hale Champion
who urged him to call the Guard, Anderson ordered General Hill to commit the troops. At 4:00 p.m., he announced this decision
to the press. At 5:00 p.m., in the Governor's office downtown, he signed the proclamation officially calling the Guard.
By 6:00 p.m., 1,336 National Guard troops were assembled in the armories. These troops were enroute to two staging areas
in the rioting area by 7:00 p.m. However, neither the officials of the Los Angeles Police Department nor officers of the Guard
deployed any of the troops until shortly after 10:00 p.m. Having in mind these delays, we believe that law enforcement agencies
and the National Guard should develop contingency plans so that in future situations of emergency, there will be a better
method at hand to assure the early commitment of the National Guard and the rapid deployment of the troops.
The first death occurred between 6: 00 and 7: 00 p.m. Friday, when a Negro bystander, trapped on the street between police
and rioters, was shot and killed during an exchange of gunfire.
The Worst Night
Friday was the worst night. The riot moved out of the Watts area and burning and looting spread over wide areas of Southeast
Los Angeles several miles apart. At 1:00 a.m. Saturday, there were 100 engine companies fighting fires in the area. Snipers
shot at firemen as they fought new fires. That night, a fireman was crushed and killed on the fire line by a falling wall,
and a deputy sheriff was killed when another sheriff's shotgun was discharged in a struggle with rioters.
Friday night, the law enforcement officials tried a different tactic. Police officers made sweeps on foot, moving en masse
along streets to control activity and enable firemen to fight fires. By midnight, Friday, another 1,000 National Guard troops
were marching shoulder to shoulder clearing the streets. By 3:00 a.m. Saturday, 3,356 guardsmen were on the streets, and the
number continued to increase until the full commitment of 13,900 guardsmen was reached by midnight on Saturday. The maximum
commitment of the Los Angeles Police Department during the riot period was 934 officers; the maximum for the Sheriff's Office
was 719 officers.
Despite the new tactics and added personnel, the area was not under control at any time on Friday night, as major calls
of looting, burning, and shooting were reported every two to three minutes. On throughout the morning hours of Saturday and
during the long day, the crowds of looters and patterns of burning spread out and increased still further until it became
necessary to impose a curfew on the 46.5 square-mile area on Saturday. Lieutenant Governor Anderson appeared on television
early Saturday evening to explain the curfew, which made it a crime for any unauthorized persons to be on the streets in the
curfew area after 8:00 p.m.
The Beginning of Control
Much of the Saturday burning had been along Central Avenue. Again using sweep tactics, the guardsmen and police were able
to clear this area by 3:30 p.m. Guardsmen rode "shotgun" on the fire engines and effectively stopped the sniping and rock
throwing at firemen. Saturday evening, road blocks were set up in anticipation of the curfew. The massive show of force was
having some effect although there was still riot activity and rumors spread regarding proposed activity in the south central
area.
When the curfew started at 8:00 p.m., police and guardsmen were able to deal with the riot area as a whole. Compared with
the holocaust of Friday evening, the streets were relatively quiet. The only major exception was the burning of a block of
stores on Broadway between 46th and 48th Streets. Snipers again prevented firemen from entering the area, and while the buildings
burned, a gun battle ensued between law enforcement officers, the Guard, and the snipers.
During the day Sunday, the curfew area was relatively quiet. Because many markets had been destroyed, food distribution
was started by churches, community groups, and government agencies. Governor Brown, who had returned Saturday night, personally
toured the area, talking to residents. Major fires were under control but there were new fires and some rekindling of old
ones. By Tuesday, Governor Brown was able to lift the curfew and by the following Sunday, only 252 guardsmen remained.
Coordination between the several law enforcement agencies during the period of the riot was commendable. @en the California
Highway Patrol called for help on Wednesday evening, the Los Angeles Police Department responded immediately. When the situation
grew critical Thursday evening, the Los Angeles Sheriff's Office committed substantial forces without hesitation. Indeed,
the members of all law enforcement agencies - policemen, sheriff's officers, highway Patrolmen, city Marshalls - and the Fire
Departments as well - worked long hours, in harmony and with conspicuous bravery, to quell the disorder. However, the depth
and the seriousness of the situation were not accurately appraised in the early stages, and the law enforcement forces committed
and engaged in the several efforts to bring the riots under control on Thursday night and all day Friday proved to be inadequate.
It required massive force to subdue the riot, as demonstrated by the effectiveness of the Guard when it moved into position
late Friday night and worked in coordination with the local law enforcement units.
Other Areas Affected
As the word of the South Los Angeles violence was flashed almost continuously by all news media, the unrest spread. Although
outbreaks in other areas were minor by comparison with those in South Central Los Angeles, each one held dangerous potential.
San Diego, 102 miles away, had three days of rioting and 81 people were arrested. On Friday night, there was rioting in Pasadena,
12 miles from the curfew zone. There, liquor and gun stores were looted and Molotov cocktails and fire bombs were thrown at
police cars. Only prompt and skillful handling by the police prevented this situation from getting out of control.
Pacoima, 20 miles north, had scattered rioting, looting, and burning. There was burning in Monrovia, 25 miles east. On
Sunday night, after the curfew area was quiet, there was an incident in Long Beach, 12 miles south. About 200 guardsmen and
Los Angeles police assisted Long Beach police in containing a dangerous situation which exploded when a policeman was shot
when another officer's gun discharged as he was being attacked by rioters. Several fires were set Sunday night in the San
Pedro-Wilmington area, 12 miles south.
Was There a Pre-established Plan?
After a thorough examination, the Commission has concluded that there is no reliable evidence of outside leadership or
pre-established plans for the rioting. The testimony of law enforcement agencies and their respective intelligence officers
supports this conclusion. The Attorney General, the District Attorney, and the Los Angeles police have all reached the conclusion
that there is no evidence of a pre-plan or a pre-established central direction of the rioting activities. This finding was
submitted to the Grand Jury by the District Attorney.
This is not to say that there was no agitation or promotion of the rioting by local groups or gangs which exist in pockets
throughout the south central area. The sudden appearance of Molotov cocktails in quantity and the unexplained movement of
men in cars through the areas of great destruction support the conclusion that there was organization and planning after the
riots commenced. In addition, on that tense Thursday, inflammatory handbills suddenly appeared in Watts. But this cannot be
identified as a master plan by one group; rather it appears to have been the work of several gangs, with membership of young
men ranging in age from 14 to 35 years. All of these activities intensified the rioting and caused it to spread with increased
violence from one district to another in the curfew area.
The Grim Statistics
The final statistics are staggering. There were 34 persons killed and 1,032 reported injuries, including 90 Los Angeles
police officers, 136 firemen, 10 national guardsmen, 23 persons from other governmental agencies, and 773 civilians. 118 of
the injuries resulted from gunshot wounds. Of the 34 killed, one was a fireman, one was a deputy sheriff, and one a Long Beach
policeman.
In the weeks following the riots, Coroner's Inquests were held regarding thirty-two of the deaths.* The Coroner's jury
ruled that twenty-six of the deaths were justifiable homicide, five were homicidal, and one was accidental. Of those ruled
justifiable homicide, the jury found that death was caused in sixteen instances by officers of the Los Angeles Police Department
and in seven instances by the National Guard. * *
* The Coroner's Inquest into one of the deaths was canceled at the request of the deceased's family. There
was no inquest into the death of the deputy sheriff because of pending criminal proceedings.
**A legal memorandum analyzing the procedures followed in the inquests, which was prepared at the request of the Commission,
has been forwarded to the appropriate public officials for their consideration.
It has been estimated that the loss of property attributable to the riots was over $40 million. More than
600 buildings were damaged by burning and looting. Of this number, more than 200 were totally destroyed by fire. The rioters
concentrated primarily on food markets, liquor stores, furniture stores, clothing stores, department stores, and pawn shops.
Arson arrests numbered 27 and 10 arson complaints were filed, a relatively small number considering that fire department officials
say that all of the fires were incendiary in origin. Between 2,000 and 3,000 fire alarms were recorded during the riot, 1,000
of these between 7:00 a.m. on Friday and 7:00 a.m. on Saturday. We note with interest that no residences were deliberately
burned, that damage to schools, libraries, churches and public buildings was minimal, and that certain types of business establishments,
notably service stations and automobile dealers, were for the most part unharmed.
There were 3,438 adults arrested, 71% for burglary and theft. The number of juveniles arrested was 514, 81%
for burglary and theft. Of the adults arrested, 1,232 had never been arrested before; 1,164 had a "minor" criminal record
(arrest only or convictions with sentence of 90 days or less); 1,042 with "major" criminal record (convictions with sentence
of more than 90 days). Of the juveniles arrested, 257 had never been arrested before; 212 had a 44minor" criminal record;
43 had a "major" criminal record. Of the adults arrested, 2,057 were born in 16 southern states whereas the comparable figure
for juveniles was 13 1. Some of the juveniles arrested extensively damaged the top two floors of an auxiliary jail which had
been opened on the Saturday of the riots.
Those involved in the administration of justice - judges, prosecutors, defense counsel, and others-merit commendation
for the steps they took to cope with the extraordinary responsibility thrust on the judicial system by the riots. By reorganizing
calendars and making special assignments, the Los Angeles Superior and Municipal Courts have been able to meet the statutory
deadlines for processing the cases of those arrested. Court statistics indicate that by November 26, the following dispositions
had been made of the 2278 felony cases filed against adults: 856 were found guilty; 155 were acquitted; 641 were disposed
of prior to trial, Primarily by dismissal; 626 are awaiting trial. Of the 1133 misdemeanor cases filed, 733 were found guilty,
81 were acquitted, 184 dismissed and 135 are awaiting trial.
The Police and Sheriff's Department have long known that many members of gangs, as well as others, in the
south central area Possessed weapons and knew how to use them. However, the extent to which pawn shops, each one of which
Possessed an inventory of weapons, were the immediate target of looters, leads to the conclusion that a substantial number
of the weapons used were stolen from these shops. During the riots, law enforcement officers recovered 851 weapons. There
is no evidence that the rioters made any attempt to steal narcotics from pharmacies in the riot area even though some pharmacies
Were looted and burned.
Overwhelming as are the grim statistics, the impact of the August rioting on the Los Angeles community has
been even greater. The first weeks after the disorders brought a flood tide of charges and recriminations, Although this has
now ebbed, the feeling of fear and tension persists, largely unabated, throughout the community. A certain slowness in the
rebuilding of the fired structures has symbolized the difficulty in mending relationships in our community which were so severely
fractured by the August nightmare.
